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Introduction
The 1990s surge in various forms of decentralized manage-
ment of natural resources in Africa sparked scholarly interest 
in the outcome of Community-Based Natural Resources 
Management (CBNRM; Nelson & Agrawal, 2008; Ostrom, 
1999; Ribot, 2002, 2004; Songorwa, Buhrs, & Hughey, 
2000). Some CBNRM programs at some point appeared rea-
sonably successful in their promotion of natural resource 
conservation and improved rural livelihoods. These include 
Community Conservancies in Namibia, the Communal 
Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, and the Administrative 
Management and Design for Game Management Areas 
(ADMADE) in Zambia (Nelson & Agrawal, 2008; Songorwa, 
1999). However, the institutional reforms necessary to real-
ize the potentials of CBNRM remain a pervasive constraint. 
Specifically, central governments and frontline agents are 
often reluctant to transfer sufficient powers over resources 
and associated revenues to local governments and, through 
an array of technical requirements, central governments have 
managed to recentralize control over decentralized resources 
(Nelson, Nshala, & Rodgers, 2007; Ribot, Agrawal, & 
Larson, 2006). The outcomes include reduced welfare of 
involved communities, particularly the most vulnerable 
subgroups rather than development and poverty alleviation 
as envisioned (Roe & Nelson, 2009). Major weaknesses of 
this kind are, for instance, observed in ADMADE in Zambia 
and CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe (Junge, 2002; Mutandwa & 
Gadzirayi, 2009; Nelson & Agrawal, 2008; Regional Center 
for Southern Africa, 1998; Ribot, 2004).
Tanzania’s 1998 Wildlife Policy (Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism [MNRT], 1998) introduced the con-
cept of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs). The policy 
defines WMAs as areas on village land set aside for wildlife 
conservation. WMAs aim to improve wildlife conservation 
and rural communities’ livelihoods by giving communities 
full mandate to manage and benefit from wildlife. 
Accordingly, the economic rationale for village governments 
is that business agreements with tourist lodge and safari tour 
operators would more than compensate the loss associated 
with restrictions of rights to extract products, graze livestock, 
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Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) are establishments that promote wildlife conservation and rural development in 
Tanzania. However, through focus group discussions, key informant interviews, a questionnaire survey, and literature review, 
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and expand cropland and settlements. The concept and objec-
tive of WMAs are maintained in the revised 2007 Wildlife 
policy (MNRT, 2007). Currently, there are about 38 WMAs 
at different stages of development covering about 13% of 
Tanzania’s total land area (Bluwstein & Lund, 2018 in 
Wambura, 2015).
The shift from a centralized toward a decentralized wild-
life management policy in Tanzania called for new institu-
tional arrangements. Here, we consider institutions as 
informal and formal rules (Ostrom, 1990) including the 
Constitution, policies, legislation, regulations, guidelines, 
and bylaws. The WMA program and accompanying decen-
tralization policy reforms has faced many challenges, includ-
ing the mentioned tendency of central governments to 
recentralize power and benefits (Shilereyo, 2010), and asso-
ciated local resistance (Benjaminsen, Goldman, Minwary, & 
Maganga, 2013; Nelson & Makko, 2005). Many WMAs, 
including Burunge in northwestern Tanzania, have experi-
enced conflicts between the central government, district 
councils, and villages over the allocation and use of benefits 
accruing from WMAs. As a result, some participating vil-
lages want to pull out of WMAs (Mbunda, 2010; Nelson 
et al., 2007).
Burunge was one of the first nine pilot WMAs officially 
launched in 2003 and among the first to gain official status in 
2006 (U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], 
2013; World Wide Fund [WWF], 2014). Burunge WMA is of 
high importance to Tanzania’s protected area network as a 
wildlife corridor (USAID, 2013) linking Tarangire National 
Park, Lake Manyara National Park, Manyara Ranch, and the 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area (WWF, 2014). It is also 
flaunted as one of the best managed WMAs (African Wildlife 
Foundation, 2013) and among the most successful because it 
generates the highest revenues of all WMAs in Tanzania 
(Veit, 2010). Also, the USAID’s (2013) WMA evaluation 
report considered it an overall success based on its high 
income and economic potential due to its accessibility and 
location between major national parks on the northern tourist 
circuit. Information on its institutional performance is, how-
ever, limited. Furthermore, the fact that two villages—
Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu—wish to withdraw from the 
WMA (Igoe & Croucher, 2007; USAID, 2013) merits a 
closer look at the institutional choices and associated perfor-
mance in Burunge.
Accordingly, this study examines the local reality in 
Burunge WMA compared with the expected and officially 
intended outcome of decentralized wildlife management in 
Tanzania. The study addresses the participation of local com-
munities in the process of WMA establishment; local aware-
ness of WMA-related institutions, including contracts with 
investors; institutionally determined change in resource use 
before and after WMA establishment; and benefits provided to 
local households from the WMA. The study aims to facilitate 
informed decisions about the design of institutions for 
improved performance of WMAs and other community-based 
conservation approaches in Tanzania and elsewhere where 
conditions are comparable.
Method
Description of the Study Area
Fieldwork was carried out over a period of 3 months in 2014 
to 2016 in four villages in Burunge WMA (Figure 1). The 
process of establishing Burunge took place during the period 
2003 to 2006 and followed the Wildlife Management Areas 
Regulation of 2002 (revised in 2005 and 2012). The 2002 
and 2005 WMA Regulations referred to the Wildlife 
Conservation Act No 12 of 1974. The 1974 Wildlife 
Conservation Act was repealed by the Wildlife Conservation 
Act No 5 of 2009, which forms the legal basis for subsequent 
WMA Regulations. At the local level, the legislation stipu-
lates the formation of a new organization, the Community-
Based Organization (CBO). The CBO represents the 
combined interests of participating villages that contribute 
land to the WMA. This CBO became the Authorized 
Association (AA) for Burunge WMA in 2006 when the 
director of the Wildlife Division under the MNRT endowed 
it with the wildlife user rights.
Burunge WMA covers 283 km2 in Babati district and 
forms a wildlife corridor between Tarangire and Manyara 
National Parks (Sulle, Lekaita, & Nelson, 2011). The Great 
East African Rift Valley Escarpment is visible from all 
angles within Burunge WMA, which includes land from 
10 villages, namely, Mwada, Sangaiwe, Ngoley, Vilima 
Vitatu, Kakoi, Olasit, Manyara, Magara, Maweni, and 
Minjingu. Livestock keeping is the main land use supple-
mented by small-scale farming. The main food crops 
include maize, beans, bananas, millet, paddy rice, and 
potatoes. Sesame is the main cash crop primarily because 
wild animals such as elephants do not eat it. The rainy sea-
son begins in November and ends in May, the rainfall 
ranges between 400 and 500 mm per year, and the tem-
perature ranges between 18 °C and 33 °C (Burunge AA, 
2011).
Data Collection Method
A cross-sectional research design was used to collect data 
from four purposefully selected villages; Mwada, Vilima 
Vitatu, Minjingu, and Kakoi. Prior information suggested 
that these villages represented different degrees of participa-
tion in and satisfaction with Burunge WMA. Mwada village 
was happy with the WMA while Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu 
wanted to withdraw. Kakoi was a relatively new village split 
out from Minjingu village, which felt cheated into joining 
the WMA and complained that they could no longer graze 
their livestock in the WMA area. Primary data collection 
techniques included focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews, literature review, participant observation, and a 
Kicheleri et al. 3
questionnaire survey. Secondary data comprised WMA man-
agement documents, academic papers, and official docu-
ments (policies, laws, and regulations).
Focus group discussions and key informant interviews 
served to obtain an overview of relevant issues and to 
inform the design of the questionnaires. Focus group dis-
cussions (six in total) included Village Councils in Mwada, 
Vilima Vitatu, and Minjingu, and one with youth, one with 
women, and one with senior men. No focus group discus-
sion was undertaken with the Council in Kakoi due to data 
saturation. A review of management documents served to 
cross-check legal questions that came up during focus 
group discussions and key informant interviews. Similarly, 
key informant interviews continued until the point of data 
saturation (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). Key infor-
mant interviews and focus group discussions inquired 
about the process of establishing the WMA, its manage-
ment, and the level of participation of local communities 
in various WMA activities. Triangulation of information 
obtained from villagers, village leaders, WMA officials, 
and the district council officials served to validate 
information.
Respondents for the questionnaire survey were drawn 
randomly from the village register of each village (n = 140 
households in total). Questions concerned local people’s par-
ticipation in the WMA initiation process, their awareness of 
WMA rules, the change of rules, comparing the situation 
before and after the establishment of the WMA, and benefits 
accrued at the household level from the WMA. The first 
author conducted all interviews face-to-face with the respon-
dents in Kiswahili.
Data Analysis
Analytically, we draw on Ostrom’s (1990), Ribot’s (2002), 
Agrawal and Gupta’s (2005), and Lindsay’s (1999, 2004) 
theories and analyses of institutions, decentralization, and 
legislation on the management of common pool resources. It 
shows how institutional choices and design work against the 
interests and expectations of local people who seemingly 
trusted that they would benefit from the WMA. Furthermore, 
we investigate the nexus between the legal basis for WMAs 
and socioeconomic outcomes at the village and household 
level to shed light on reasons why the theoretically promis-
ing combination of protection of wildlife and local develop-
ment including poverty alleviation has gone awry in practice 
(Igoe & Croucher, 2007).
Moreover, drawing on International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED; 1994) and Arnstein 
(1969), we characterize villagers’ participation in establish-
ing and running the WMA at six different levels: (a) listened 
only, (b) listened and gave information, (c) consulted, (d) 
involved in policy analysis and agenda setting, (e) reaching 
consensus on the main policy element, and (f) involved in 
policy strategy development and its components. 
Furthermore, we use descriptive statistical analysis, includ-
ing calculation of percentages and cross tabulation, to ana-
lyze and compare responses. We applied scoring on questions 
related to participation and benefits received from the WMA 
and a Likert-type scale to evaluate responses on respondents’ 
awareness of operational rules and change of rules before 
and after the WMA establishment. Hence, each respondent 
was asked to what extent they agreed with the statement that 
Figure 1. Map showing Burunge WMA and the surrounding villages.
Note. WMA = Wildlife Management Area.
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they (a) listened only in terms of strongly agree, agree, neu-
tral, disagree, and strongly disagree. Likert-type categories 
were combined in different ways for presentation. After cod-
ing and cleaning, Likert-type scale data were analyzed in 
SPSS, Version 2.0. Qualitative data generated through focus 
group discussions, participant observation, interviews, and a 
desk study of official documents (including acts, regulations, 
and policies) were subjected to content analysis by categoriz-
ing groups of words with similar meaning following Stemler 
(2001). Underlying themes in the categories of words were 
identified, explained, clarified, and interpreted (Kohlbacher, 
2005).
Results
Participation in the WMA Establishment Process
Overall scores for all levels of participation showed that 
about 84% of the respondents did not participate in the pro-
cess of WMA establishment. Individual levels of participa-
tion show that communities were highly involved at the first 
level, that is, listening only (Figure 2).
Only very few respondents were consulted or involved in 
reaching a consensus on the main policy document of the 
1998 Wildlife Policy introducing WMAs in Tanzania. The 
very few who felt that they had participated at all levels were 
either village leaders or people who were more educated and 
in positions such as Village Council members. For instance, 
a man of about 68 years stated that he participated fully in the 
policy process. However, he was a former government 
employee who had settled in the village after his retirement. 
Key informant interviews and focus group discussion results 
further revealed that communities’ acceptance of the WMA 
during its initiation phase was low.
The communities did not participate in the policy devel-
opment process, which is not surprising, but they did not par-
ticipate much in the subsequent making of WMA rules either, 
which is obviously problematic and clearly against the letter 
as well as the spirit of the 1998 Wildlife Policy. The WMA 
rules form part of the legally required management plans that 
Authorized Associations must prepare and have officially 
approved, in 2006 by the Director of Wildlife, to acquire 
authority over the WMA area. Sections 36 and 37, including 
the associated Seventh and Eighth Schedules of the 2002 and 
2005 WMA Regulations, which are identical in this respect, 
specify the legal requirements. A key feature is that the 
Authorized Association must divide the WMA area into dif-
ferent zones and specify rules for each zone. Importantly, 
neither the 2002 nor the 2005 WMA Regulations require that 
participating Village Councils or General Assemblies 
approve the rules within WMA zones before the Director of 
Game can endorse them. Rather, the Seventh Schedule of the 
Regulations focuses on technical and biological matters and 
only mentions that consultative workshops should be con-
ducted to analyze problems and present the purpose and 
objectives of the WMA as well as to undertake technical 
decisions on zoning and draw up environmental impact state-
ments on proposed actions in each zone. Sections 31 and 32 
in the 2012 WMA Regulations are essentially similar to sec-
tions 36 and 37 in the 2002 and 2005 WMA Regulations with 
the exception that it is the minister responsible for wildlife 
who approves the general WMA Management Plan while 
approval of the associated Resource Management Zone 
Plans falls under the Director of Wildlife’s authority. The 
wording of the Sixth and Seventh Schedules in the 2012 
WMA Regulations is identical to that of the 2002 and 2005 
Regulations’ Seventh and Eighth schedules, respectively. 
This is a top-down techno-bureaucratic rather than bottom-
up participatory, or democratic, approach to the development 
of WMA rules. Section 31(4) of the Wildlife Conservation 
Act (United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 2009) reflects a 
similar thinking as it directs the minister responsible for 
WMAs in the MNRT and the local government authorities to 
prepare model bylaws to be used by the village authorities. 
Figure 2. Levels of participation in the process for WMA establishment (n = 140).
Note. WMA = Wildlife Management Area.
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Although such model bylaws are yet to materialize, it is evi-
dent that subsequent law has converted the participatory and 
democratic vision of the 1998 Wildlife Policy to techno-
bureaucratic procedures that facilitate and promote WMA 
rulemaking processes, which prevent local people, who are 
supposed to follow these rules, from influencing them.
Section 77 in the 2002 and 2005 WMA Regulations 
authorized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), in col-
laboration with government agencies, to facilitate the estab-
lishment of WMAs right from initiation and planning to 
rulemaking and enforcement. Section 28(1) in the 2012 
WMA Regulations maintains an almost similar wording as 
section 77 in the 2002 WMA Regulations, but a new subsec-
tion 28(2) specifies that an NGO must obtain written approval 
from the minister before it can engage in the establishment 
and implementation of WMAs. Such central control of 
NGOs’ involvement in particular WMAs also formed part of 
section 77 in the 2002 Regulations, although the wording 
was more suggestive than prescriptive (the minister may 
approve an NGO vs. the NGO shall obtain written approval 
from the Minister). Curiously, the 2005 WMA Regulations 
were entirely silent on this aspect of central regulation of 
NGOs. Financially, it makes sense for the Government of 
Tanzania to specify the legal terms for NGOs’ involvement 
in establishing WMAs, which is a costly undertaking. To 
nature conservation-oriented organizations, WMAs obvi-
ously presents an opportunity to expand and connect existing 
protected areas.
The AWF, an international NGO, facilitated the establish-
ment of Burunge WMA and essentially influenced the WMA 
rules (Igoe & Croucher, 2007; Sachedina, 2010) which may 
explain why the rules seem to lack legitimacy and accep-
tance. For instance, people continue to fish in Burunge Lake 
but do so at night. During fieldwork, people frequently 
offered the first author to buy fish from the lake, but the trade 
took place in private homes to hide it. Section 31(6) in the 
2009 Wildlife Conservation Act and 51(1) the 2002/5 WMA 
Regulations (41[1] in the 2012 WMA Regulations is identi-
cal) directs that consumptive utilization of resources must 
comply with the respective legislations, WMA Resource 
Zone Management Plans, and General Management Plans, 
and regulations. The Burunge General Management Plan is 
silent about fishing in Burunge Lake. However, since 
Burunge Lake is part of the WMA, it is, therefore, the District 
Fishery Officer who can issue fishing licenses but this does 
not happen because the District Council has decided to ban 
fishing in the lake. Here we observe that wildlife and fish fall 
under different authorities within village land under the 
WMA, which confuses on the community. Interview results 
showed that communities would like to manage Burunge 
Lake as a Beach Management Unit (cf. Fisheries Regulation 
104; MNRT, 2003) where communities would have greater 
access, and a greater say regarding fishing in the Lake than 
now where the lake falls under the WMA. Furthermore, as a 
result of not being involved in rulemaking and showing dis-
agreement regarding the existing WMA rules, some people 
grazed their cattle within the WMA against the rules, espe-
cially during the dry season. This has often led to confronta-
tions between local communities and the WMA rule 
enforcing Village Game Scouts of the Authorized Association 
as well as the guides of eco-tourism investors. The General 
Management Plan (Burunge AA, 2011) divides Burunge 
WMA into six management zones. Among the six zones, 
local communities are allowed to use only one zone known 
as the General Use Zone, identified as “an area of low con-
servation value” (Burunge AA, 2011, p. 37), and it covers 
13.6% of the total area of Burunge WMA (283 km2). Access 
to other zones in the WMA is either strictly prohibited or 
required a permit from the WMA office. Communities often 
complained, during focus group discussions and interviews, 
that the grazing ban, especially in the WMA Hunting Zone 
(only for tourists, see below), was against promises made 
during the WMA establishment.
Awareness of Institutions During the WMA 
Establishment Process
The majority (83%) of the respondents in all four villages 
were not aware of the 1998 National Wildlife Policy (MNRT, 
1998) during the initiation of the WMA establishment pro-
cess (Figure 3).
After experiencing the result of the policy through the 
WMA rules, about 59% of the respondents strongly dis-
agreed that the wildlife policy had solved key community 
problems. As one respondent lamented,
How can that policy improve peoples’ lives if we are living in 
mud houses while we are deprived of grasses for roofing, poles 
for building, firewood for cooking and we have no electricity for 
Figure 3. Awareness of the 1998 Wildlife Management Area 
policy document (n = 140).
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lighting. We wonder how the government can care more for the 
wild animals and forget about us.
Nevertheless, about 31% of the respondents strongly agreed 
that the policy aimed to solve key community problems—
although, according to the focus group discussions, commu-
nities felt that the government has directed its focus more 
toward conservation contrary to promises made and there-
fore in contradiction to people’s expectations.
The majority (70%) of respondents did not understand 
what a WMA constitutes before accepting it during the WMA 
initiation process, and 61% completely disagreed that rules 
were the result of a participatory approach where they could 
influence their development.
Sidelining Community Members’ Interests by Law
Section 22 of the 2002/5 Regulations describes the functions 
of the Authorized Association. It opens by stating, “an 
Authorized Association shall be accountable to the Village 
Council[s].” Village Council members in our case did not 
know about this clause. The Regulations are also entirely 
silent on how such accountability should be established in 
practice. Rather, a long list of functions (a-y) that the 
Authorized Association shall perform, particularly the ones 
described under subsections (d), (g), (l), (g), (o), (p), (r), and 
(s), establish Authorized Associations as the extended arm of 
central government institutions. Subsection 22(h) authorizes 
Authorized Associations to negotiate and enter into contrac-
tual agreements with investors in the WMA. Subsection 
22(j) states that the Authorized Association shall, among oth-
ers, seek (our emphasis) authorization from the Village 
Assembly, that is, all adults older than the age of 18, and 
report [about] investment activities to the Assembly. As the 
legal procedures do not explicitly demand that Authorized 
Association obtain written consent (which is different from 
seeking authorization) of the concerned Village Assemblies, 
it is unclear whether the Authorized Authority in Burunge 
WMA could enter into legally binding contracts with inves-
tors, for example, to establish tourist lodges and run photo 
and hunting safari activities, without such consent. Section 
18 of the 2012 WMA Regulations is almost similar to section 
22 in the 2002/5 WMA Regulations, but the changes weaken 
the authority of the Authorized Association vis á vis the cen-
tral government and the Village Councils/Assemblies vis á 
vis the Authorized Association. Moreover, subsection 18(k) 
directs the Authorized Association to “communicate invest-
ment activities to Village Assemblies before signing an 
investment agreement.” Hence, the legally required level of 
Village citizens’ participation in signing contracts with exter-
nal investors is now limited to being informed.
Interview results revealed that issues of investments were 
hidden from regular community members. In particular, 
respondents complained that they could not even see the con-
tracts made between the WMA and eco-tourism investors. 
The WMA Regulations of 2002, 2005, and 2012 (MNRT, 
2002, 2005, 2012) all include a part called “Investments and 
Development in Wildlife Management Areas,” which stipu-
lates the procedures for entering into contracts with inves-
tors. These rules are identical in the 2002/5 WMA Regulations 
and include strong elements of recentralization, which the 
2012 WMA Regulations even tighten.
Sections 63 to 66 in the 2002/5 WMA Regulations grant 
Authorized Associations the right to invite and form joint 
ventures with external investors. Such rights are maintained 
but in a modified form under sections 59 to 62 in the 2012 
WMA Regulations. However, clause 65(4) in the 2002/5 
WMA Regulations states, “No investment agreement or joint 
venture shall be operative without prior approval of the 
Director of Game.” Furthermore, clause 66(5) in the 2002/5 
WMA Regulations reads; “Subject to the provisions of these 
Regulations, the Director [of Game] shall have the power to 
withdraw or revoke any investment agreement.” These bla-
tantly recentralizing clauses are absent in the 2012 WMA 
Regulations, but clauses 62(1 & 4) read, “An investor shall 
not enter into an investment agreement or joint venture 
agreement unless with the consent of the Director [of 
Wildlife]” and “Subject to the provisions of these Regulations, 
the Director [of Wildlife] shall have the power to advise the 
Authorized Authority to withdraw, revoke or amend any 
investment agreement,” respectively. In respect of invest-
ments proposed by a commercial operator, the Authorized 
Association may (our emphasis) according to the 2002/5 
WMA Regulations 63(6) & (7) seek assistance from the 
District Natural Resource Advisory Body and/or the Director 
of Game. Under the 2012 WMA Regulations 59(6) & (7), the 
Authorized Associations shall (our emphasis) obtain advice 
from the District Natural Resource Advisory Body and shall 
ensure that a representative of the Director of Wildlife and 
the District Council are fully involved in the entire process of 
negotiating and signing an investment and development 
agreement (our emphasis).
Accordingly, the legal power to effectively control or 
intervene into the very agreements that should make 
WMAs economically attractive to villages rests and has 
always rested firmly with the Director of Wildlife (for-
merly called the Director of Game). Thus, the law effec-
tively de-authorizes Authorized Associations as it prevents 
them from independently entering into agreements that 
should make WMAs economically attractive to village 
governments and their constituencies.
Section 63(6 & 7) in the 2002/5 Regulations, which are 
identical, specifies that when negotiating a contract with a 
prospective investor, an Authorized Association may (our 
emphasis) seek assistance of the District Natural Resource 
Advisory Body and that the Director for Wildlife may (our 
emphasis) consult with the responsible authorities on such 
investments. Section 59 of the 2012 WMA Regulations sub-
stitute these provisions in a direction that effectively de-
authorizes concerned Village Councils, by not mentioning 
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them, while explicitly mentioning district and national-level 
actors, which strengthen their institutional position. The new 
section 59(2) states that investors shall (our emphasis) be 
identified through a tendering process where the tender eval-
uation committee in accordance with section 50 shall com-
prise of maximum seven members appointed among 
members of the Authorized Association, the District Natural 
Resource Advisory Body, and a representative of the Director 
of Wildlife. Notably, this committee excludes members of 
Village Councils, but it may co-opt advisors. Hence, the 
WMA Regulations, especially the 2012 version, appears to 
contradict section 5(g) in the 2009 Wildlife Conservation 
Act, the objective of which is to “encourage, promote and 
facilitate active involvement and participation of local and 
traditional communities in the sustainable management, use 
and conservation of wildlife resources in and outside wildlife 
protected areas network[s].” On the contrary, Section 31 in 
the same act, which together with section 121 forms the legal 
foundation of the 2012 Regulations, does not even mention 
Village Councils; neither as local authorities who must be 
party to investment agreements, nor as authorities who must 
at least be informed or have a right to access information 
about business arrangements between investors and the 
WMA that they are part of.
The 2002/5 WMA Regulations 63(8) stipulate that any 
investment agreement must follow the prescriptions of “the 
Twelfth Schedule to the Regulations.” Section 10 in this 
Schedule specifies that the investor shall maintain and keep 
records and books of accounts and that the Authorized 
Association shall have access to such records and accounts. 
Furthermore, this section considers noncompliance by 
the investor a breach of the agreement that would entitle the 
Authorized Association to revoke the agreement. Under the 
2012 WMA Regulations 59(8), a similar reference is made 
to “the Eleventh Schedule to the Regulations.” However, 
nothing in this updated Schedule requires that Authorized 
Associations have access to their investors’ records and 
books of accounts. Whether the 2012 WMA Regulations’ 
(75) revocation of the 2005 WMA Regulations extinguishes 
such pre-2012 rights of Authorized Associations is unclear. 
It is, however, clear that the exclusive rights of Authorized 
Associations to negotiate agreements with commercial 
investors and to monitor the business activities of such 
investors have been severely curtailed and deliberately 
transferred to higher levels of governance that are not 
accountable to Village Governments or village citizens. 
The underlying motivation for this legislative change 
remains obscure, but it creates a space for unofficial pay-
ments by investors in WMAs to the Director of Wildlife and 
District Council representatives.
Village Councils in the four case villages stated that 
they did not have access to contracts between the 
Authorized Association and investors. This perfectly fol-
lows section 63(9) in the 2002/5 WMA Regulations that 
are identical to section 59(9) in the 2012 WMA Regulations, 
which states that copies of contracts with investors must be 
provided to the District Council and the Director of 
Wildlife. Village Councils are simply not mentioned. 
Burunge WMA office denied us access to copies of the 
contracts because these were confidential agreements 
between the WMA and inventors. Again, this is in perfect 
agreement with the past and current WMA Regulations, 
which, transfers the authority of Village Councils, origi-
nally the ultimate overseers, managers, and administrators 
of village affairs (URT, 1982), to the Authorized 
Associations concerned. In fact, sections 21(a & h) in the 
2002/5 Regulations, which are identical to sections 17(a & 
g) in the 2012 WMA Regulations, reduce the role of Village 
Councils to be responsible (our emphasis) for (a) provid-
ing land for the WMA and (b) promoting a secure and 
favorable business environment in the WMA. Ironically, 
section 21(f) in the 2002/5 WMA Regulations, which is 
identical to section 17(g) in 2012 WMA Regulations 
requires (our emphasis) that Village Councils monitor the 
activities of the Authorized Association and report to their 
constituency and the District Council. Village Council 
members who participated in the focus group discussions 
did not know about this responsibility.
Consequently, a lack of awareness among Village Council 
members about the official rules guiding their limited formal 
rights to influence the governance of the WMA had left them 
alienated and vulnerable to proposed changes with negative 
implications for their constituencies. Notwithstanding the 
absence of Village Councils’ formal rights to influence and 
inspect contracts between the Authorized Association and 
investors, no provision in the WMA Regulations requires the 
translation into Swahili (the official language of the URT) or 
any other local language of contracts or agreements before 
they can take legal effect. As a result, community members 
complained that Village Council leaders, during the WMA 
establishment process, signed documents in English—a lan-
guage they did not understand. Furthermore, our respondents 
informed that the District Game Officer responsible for 
introducing the concept deliberately provided legal docu-
ments to be signed by community leaders during the WMA 
initiation process, allegedly with the objective of luring local 
communities to accept the WMA on never fulfilled verbal 
promises. Section 81 of the 2002/5 WMA Regulations, 
which is similar to section 73 of the 2012 WMA Regulations 
states that the “The Minister shall as soon as may be practi-
cal, cause these Regulations to be translated to Kiswahili.” 
Moreover, the following section in both the 2002/5 and 2012 
WMA Regulations, which are similar, states that “Whenever 
there is a conflict of interpretation between Kiswahili and 
English versions, the English version shall take precedence.” 
Notwithstanding these provisions, no regulation has to date 
been translated into Kiswahili, an omission the ministry, on 
our enquiry, could neither explain nor justify, which indi-
cates central-level indifference toward villagers’ active and 
informed participation.
8 SAGE Open
The interviewed community members also complained 
that the same District Game Officer, after the WMA was 
legally established, favored investors’ interests over those of 
the communities using WMA funds, resources, and opportu-
nities for his benefit. However, none of these claims are offi-
cially logged as legal complaints except for Minjingu village, 
which has taken the WMA, the Authorized Association, and 
an investor to court because the village was included in the 
WMA through falsified village meeting minutes that sup-
ported its inclusion (URT, 2016a).
Curiously, a new section 59(10a & b) in the 2012 WMA 
Regulations criminalizes people who try to influence vil-
lages to leave a WMA or with intent try to “impede, obstruct, 
prevent or defeat the peaceful existence of a WMA.” We 
have not been able to trace the underlying reason for this 
clause, but it appears a deliberate attempt to curtail people’s 
freedom to express dissatisfaction with the way a WMA 
functions for their village and thus serves, through intimida-
tion, to bind villages to WMA agreements that they may find 
unattractive.
Finally, while most of the respondents did not support the 
WMA and would prefer to withdraw from it, the lack of legal 
clarity about the fate of village land after a possible with-
drawal put a brake on such ideas. Messages delivered by the 
District Game Officer served to compound this. On several 
occasions, he had told the villagers that “if you withdraw 
from the WMA, your land will be converted into a game con-
trolled area or you will be evicted.” Other statements from 
his side include “Whether you agree or not, you are in the 
WMA.” Such intimidating claims appear over the top and 
have no basis in the 2002/5 WMA Regulations, which are 
silent on the matter of villages wanting to quit a WMA. 
Interestingly, however, a new and additional subsection 6 to 
section 34 in the 2012 WMA Regulations, which is otherwise 
similar to section 39 in the 2002/5 WMA Regulations, states 
that “Where a village withdraws its membership from the 
Authorized Association, the user right [to the WMA] shall 
remain under the Authorized Association.” Whether a village 
that is part of a pre-2012 Authorized Association can with-
draw without losing rights to its part of the WMA area is 
unclear. In theory, the general norm of prohibiting retroactive 
law should make this perfectly feasible. However, the men-
tioned new clause 34(6) in the 2012 WMA Regulations is 
hardly an unintended effect of some random cause. Surely, it 
serves a policy objective of making it difficult for villages to 
pull out of a WMA should they conclude that experienced 
realities fall short of promises made by proponents of the 
concept. Accordingly, villages that form part of WMAs 
established before the 2012 Regulations are likely to think 
twice before they challenge current policy through prior law.
Awareness of Rules
Approximately, 54% of respondents were not aware of the 
WMAs operational rules. Based on a number of meetings 
convened and information flow between the Authorized 
Association and the communities, about 67% had either low 
participation or did not participate at all in WMA matters 
while 17% had an average level of participation, and the 
remaining 16% had good participation. Mwada village had 
the highest average level of participation followed by Kakoi, 
Vilima Vitatu, and Minjingu villages.
In the community setting in Tanzania, locally convened 
meetings are the most obvious ways to inform community 
members about local matters (URT, 1982). Section 18(q) in 
the 2012 WMA Regulations, which is identical to section 
22(q) in the 2002/5 WMA Regulations, requires the 
Authorized Association to provide quarterly and annual 
reports at Village Assembly meetings. However, focus group 
discussions revealed that none of the study villages had ever 
held such meetings. Key informant interviews further 
revealed that, although the most recent election of WMA 
leaders and village representatives were more than 3 years 
ago, the villagers had not received any response from the 
Authorized Association on several questions. Such questions 
include the use of the 50% of total WMA revenues that 
remain with the Authorized Association, information about 
investors and how much they contribute to the Authorized 
Association, as well as issues about the general management 
of the WMA. Also, key informants claimed that the 
Authorized Association did not share information about 
important decisions with the respective villages. For instance, 
when the Central Government, by section 16(3) in the 2016 
Wildlife Conservation Regulations (URT, 2016b) decided to 
take over the task of collecting revenues from WMA invest-
ments, the Authorized Association did not inform villages 
about this. The local informants claimed that they understood 
they were supposed to make major decisions regarding the 
WMA but wondered how they were meant to do this without 
being asked or informed about anything.
The questionnaire survey on communities’ awareness 
about rules on WMA meetings supports these observations. 
The majority (94%) of the respondents did not know how 
often meetings should be conducted while only 6% got it 
right—that is, once every 3 months. Similarly, 93% of 
respondents did not know how often WMA meetings were 
conducted in their respective villages.
Respondents offered various comments about their WMA 
meeting attendance or lack thereof. For instance, one respon-
dent claimed, “The WMA benefits only leaders who neither 
want to step down nor want to call for meetings because the 
Village Councils, WMA leaders, District Game Officer, and 
the Director of Wildlife are the ones eating up WMA money.” 
Respondents also complained about the process of making a 
new Burunge Constitution. For example, one Village Council 
leader said that
WMA meetings are frequently postponed. The ones in power 
need to step down, and elections for new leaders should be 
conducted. But the new [WMA] Constitution has provisions that 
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we do not like. The District Game Officer ordered us to sign, but 
all Village Council leaders have denied as the constitution will 
not favour our people. For example, the term of office is changed 
from 3 to 5 years, and the District Game Officer will supervise 
elections for new members of the Authorized Association. This 
is not acceptable as the District Game Officer wants to elect and 
favour certain people that he wants to hold the office for his own 
benefit.
During key informant interviews and focus group discus-
sions, respondents claimed that candidates who want to 
become village representatives in the Authorized Association 
are sometimes willing to pay bribes to the villagers to be 
selected.
Change of Operational Rules
Before the WMA establishment, the Village Land Act No 5 
of 1999 (URT, 1999) gave powers to the Village Council to 
decide about the use of their land as deemed fit. Hence, vil-
lage land was under the control of the Village Council and 
the Village Assembly could devise rules on how to manage 
and use resources on its land through village bylaws on, for 
example, agriculture, grazing, settlement, firewood collec-
tion, watershed management, extraction of building materi-
als and other nontimber forests products (URT, 1982, 1999). 
However, hunting and logging on village land required a 
license obtained from the District Council (URT, 1974). 
Village Councils could not devise bylaws for hunting as all 
wildlife, according to the 1974 and the revised 2009 Wildlife 
Conservation Act, belong to the state, which was responsible 
for managing it—even on village land. However, Village 
Councils could request a permit from the District Council to 
hunt wildlife for village consumption. Upon permission, the 
District Game officer and Village Council leaders would 
make all arrangements for hunting and distribution in the vil-
lage where villagers would buy the meat at low prices. 
Furthermore, the de jure rules (national laws) on fishing, log-
ging, and hunting were not strictly enforced, and communi-
ties could access these resources with minimal risk.
With the introduction of WMAs, villages can manage 
wildlife on their land by replacing village bylaws with WMA 
rules in the concerned areas. In Burunge, one of many effects 
is a complete and efficiently enforced ban on hunting. In 
general, the Wildlife Conservation Act, in conformity with 
all other legislation on natural resources (URT, 2009; Section 
31(6)), regulates the utilization of resources including tim-
ber, nontimber forest products, and fish within WMAs. 
Accordingly, the Village Council can no longer decide on 
resource utilization in the WMA areas by referring to the 
Village Land Act of 1999. As a result, local people must 
apply to the Authorized Association, instead of their Village 
Council concerned, for licenses or permits to extract 
resources from the WMA. This change of rules has led to 
complaints from local people, both about the bureaucracy 
involved and the unaffordability of some licenses.
As shown in Figure 4, the WMA has drastically changed 
the rules on access to and withdrawal of natural resources 
from village land. The majority of respondents strongly 
agreed that the pre-WMA rules on access to land for cultiva-
tion, wildlife hunting, grazing, fishing, collection of fire-
wood, building poles, roofing grasses, and Doum palm 
(Hyphaene compressa) were better than the post-WMA 
rules. Women in the communities earn cash by making mats, 
Figure 4. Response on the direction of change of rules on access to resources before and after WMA establishment n = 140.
Note. WMA = Wildlife Management Area.
aEnvironmental products include noncultivated products such as Doum palm (Hyphaene compressa), thatch grass, firewood, and poles.
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baskets, and various decorations from Doum palm and this 
environmental product is part of many, especially women’s, 
livelihood strategies.
Respondents complained in particular about the lack of 
information on these rule changes. As one respondent 
asserted, “We would like to know what new rules the WMA 
would lead to and be able to influence them before they took 
effect.”
Section 51 of the 2002/5 WMA Regulations, which in its 
essence is similar to section 41 of the 2012 WMA Regulations, 
states that hunting for meat in the villages should utilize the 
offtake quota issued to the Authorized Association under the 
supervision of the District Game Officer. During focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews, several people 
stated that they would like to hunt wildlife for subsistence 
use. Since establishment, the Authorized Association had 
never allowed any hunting by villagers. Quoted reasons 
include that the local hunters do not have proper weapons 
and to avoid disturbing tourists as local hunters often hunt 
close to investors’ area. Finally, in 2010, the Authorized 
Association removed local hunting for meat from the GMP 
of Burunge WMA (Burunge AA, 2011). One 70-year-old 
man in Mwada village complained about this by saying, 
“Astonishingly there are no wild animals in Arusha town, but 
bushmeat is easily accessible. But we who are living with the 
animals cannot access the bushmeat.” Expressing his griev-
ances, he provided a list of things he would like to see 
changed with regard to the WMA and requested the research 
team to present the list to those concerned (Box 1). The list 
actually forms a comprehensive alternative to the current 
state of affairs and is in close accordance with common pool 
resource management theory, specifically on inclusion, pov-
erty reduction, and decentralization (cf. Ribot, 2002, 2004; 
Ribot, Lund, & Treue, 2010).
Benefits From the WMA
As a CBO, the Authorized Association should bring local 
development, providing at least community-level if not 
household-level benefits (cf. MNRT, 1998). However, 
contrary to the policy objective, scoring results from our 
interviews show that the majority (79%) of respondents 
did not agree that the WMA has brought benefits to their 
households. Nevertheless, the WMA has financed (a) the 
construction of Village Government offices in Mwada and 
Kakoi, (b) eight classrooms in Mwada village, (c) a health 
center in Vilima Vitatu, (d) school fees for children from 
poor families, (e) training of 21 Village Game Scouts, and 
(f) training of Authorized Association members. However, 
such benefits rarely reached the household level. Only 
those who held positions in the Authorized Association 
agreed to have received benefits from the WMA. WMA 
revenue shares reaching Village Councils were further-
more not always used appropriately or used inefficiently. 
Villima Vitatu had, for instance, used about 17 million Tsh 
to construct a health center, which was later discovered to 
violate construction standards and thus demolished for 
safety reasons.
Section 73 of the 2002/5 WMA Regulations, which is 
similar to section 66 of the 2012 Regulations, authorizes the 
Central Government, through circulars issued from time to 
time (our emphasis), to regulate the sharing of benefits from 
WMAs. These sections also specify the following distribu-
tion of gross revenues: minimum 15% must be invested in 
resource development, minimum 50% should go to the par-
ticipating villages, and minimum 25% must go to the 
Authorized Association. Section 15(b) of the 2008 Wildlife 
Conservation (nonconsumptive wildlife utilization) 
Regulations directly refers to this distribution of benefits. 
However, sections 16(3), 17(1 & 2), and 19(b) in the 2016 
version of the Wildlife Conservation (nonconsumptive wild-
life utilization) introduce important changes. First, the right 
to collect fees, for example, from tourist lodge investors, is 
shifted from the Authorized Associations to the Director of 
Wildlife. Second, Authorized Associations may only charge 
fees as stipulated in the 2016 Wildlife Conservation (non-
consumptive wildlife utilization) Regulations and with writ-
ten permission from the Director of Wildlife. Third, only 
70% of the collected fees shall go to the Authorized 
Association [and shared as stipulated in the 2012 WMA 
Regulations; compare above] while the Director of Wildlife 
retains 25% and 5% goes to the District Council. Accordingly, 
the central state has recentralized the collection of revenue 
from decentralized WMAs and captured 25% of such reve-
nues for the Director of Wildlife—all in full accordance with 
the relevant legislation.
Box 1. Grievances of the Old Man.
What is annoying me is being disturbed by the wildlife, where we are able to drive them away from our farms and home gardens but, are not 
allowed. When animals invade our farms, there should be compensation. Apparently, there is nothing I am allowed to do to chase the animals 
away without being seen as a culprit. When someone is wounded by an animal there should be compensation because it is the animal that 
follows the man and not vice versa as claimed by the central and district government officials. Investors should be given investment areas as per 
the village government directives and not otherwise. There should be a contract specifying the time frame for the villagers to screen whether an 
investor is suitable or not. Investors should provide support to the community such as school benches, building classrooms and establishing water 
pumps. If a village accepts an investor, youths from that village should be employed. Compensation for someone wounded or killed by elephants, 
should be determined based on the profit those animals generate through tourism. Hence, if the profit is 300 million Tsh, then compensation 
should be 100 million. Currently our government values the animals higher than it values local humans. It should not be this way.
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Unsurprisingly, the economic consequences of this legal 
reality have resulted in discontent among community mem-
bers. As one respondent stressed, “You take care of a cow, 
and someone else comes to milk it while you do not know 
how much he gets after selling your milk.” The fact that 
equitable benefit sharing is among the objectives of the 
Wildlife Conservation Act and WMA Regulations (URT, 
2009, 2012) was unknown to community members, Village 
Councils, and WMA officials. Respondents did not know 
how much revenue the Wildlife Division collected from 
their WMA and were thus concerned about how this matched 
the funds disbursed among participating villages. As men-
tioned, at least 50% of the revenue, which the Director for 
Wildlife transfers back to the WMA should be distributed 
between the villages forming the WMA, but frequently, 
respondents questioned whether the Authorized Association 
only retained the other half to cover its expenses and to 
invest in resource conservation activities; compare above. 
However, the Authorized Association also receive aid from 
donors and NGOs including the HONEYGUIDE Foundation, 
the African Wildlife Foundation, the WWF for Nature, 
National coordination of French NGOs of international soli-
darity (FISONG), and USAID. Most of our respondents had 
concerns about how Authorized Association members and 
the District Council members used WMA revenue. As one 
put it, “They say their salary is only Tsh 200,000 per month 
but, WMA leaders are now richer than the village govern-
ment leaders.” There were also complaints about the fact 
that all villages get equal shares of the revenues returned 
from the central government while the area and ecotourism 
value of land ceded to form the WMA differed considerably 
between villages.
Discussion
At the local level, we observed little or no participation in the 
process of WMA policy development, which is not surpris-
ing. Professionals who genuinely supported the conserva-
tion-through-utilization idea of WMAs might, however, have 
foreseen many of the WMA Regulations’ problematic and 
outright adverse consequences at the local level. In the case 
villages, we observed little participation in, and high levels 
of frustration with, the way in which WMA policies pan out 
in practice.
There are many possible explanations for these observa-
tions. First, the policy process was top-down/rationalist or 
incremental/top-down. The former has low input legitimacy 
and the latter low output legitimacy. Input legitimacy involves 
political choices that involve community’s participation, or 
participation of actors who genuinely represent local commu-
nities’ interests, while output legitimacy reflects how the 
choices have addressed collective community problems dur-
ing the process of policy development (Wodschow et al., 
2016). In the case of Burunge WMA, our study strongly sug-
gests that both input and output legitimacy were low. Second, 
local communities’ representation was mostly tokenish, and 
they received little or no feedback from their supposed repre-
sentatives, for example, when rules on utilizing natural 
resources changed as a result of the WMA. Furthermore, it 
seems that a hidden objective of the WMA Regulations was to 
recentralize while (pretending) to decentralize wildlife man-
agement (Ribot et al., 2006). This article’s review of the 
WMA Regulations, including how it has evolved since the 
1998 Wildlife Policy, strongly suggests that a central tenet has 
been to limit village governments’ rights to their land, natural 
resources, and associated revenue flows, once that land 
formed part of a WMA. When village governments have 
signed WMA agreements, they are open to dispossession and 
disenfranchisement through “rule by law” as opposed to 
being enfranchised as citizens in a democratic “rule of law” 
society (e.g., Kelly, 2011). Nelson (2010) and Ribot et al. 
(2006) among others also observe unwillingness of central 
governments in other sub-Saharan African countries to 
devolve decision-making powers to local communities, 
thereby deliberately limiting their participation in matters rel-
evant to their livelihoods and well-being. Furthermore, 
Benjaminsen et al. (2013) convincingly explain WMAs as 
products of, among others, pressure from big international 
NGOs that, under a neoliberal conservation discourse, work 
in complex interactions with the neo-patrimonial state of 
Tanzania. This would explain why central actors, during the 
establishment of Burunge WMA, did not fully inform and 
involve village governments like Minjingu, which would 
stand to lose from the WMA because they were already gen-
erating significant revenues through bilateral arrangements 
with eco-tourism investors (Igoe & Croucher, 2007).
Low levels of participation in the process of WMA estab-
lishment also resulted in a low awareness of the WMAs’ 
operational rules among “ordinary” village members. This 
appears closely linked to the WMA legislations’ deliberate 
institutional choice of shifting rulemaking authority away 
from Village Governments to Authorized Associations that 
are not directly accountable to village citizens who experi-
ence uncompensated restrictions on their livelihoods due to 
the WMA rules. Bluwstein, Moyo, and Kicheleri (2016) 
made similar WMA rulemaking observations for Burunge. 
Section 31(5) in the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act states 
that “The Minister shall, in the making of regulations under 
this section ensure that the local community is properly con-
sulted and informed on how such community shall benefit 
from the Wildlife Management Areas.” However, we docu-
ment that the 2012 WMA Regulations do not grant decision-
making powers to Village General Assemblies, for example, 
to vote either for or against a proposed WMA management 
plan and associated rules. Accordingly, in this respect, the 
2012 Regulations undermine rather than specify and bolster 
the intentions of the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act. As 
Lindsay (1999) reports on the legal basis for common pool 
resource governance, such insecure and inflexible official 
rights and, we might add, the establishment of downwardly 
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unaccountable institutions put communities in a state of legal 
uncertainty. The institutional design of Authorized 
Associations also runs counter to Ostrom’s (1990, 2009) 
design principles for robust common pool resource gover-
nance institutions. Particularly, Principle 3: “Most individu-
als affected by harvesting and protection rules are included 
in the group that can modify these rules” and Principle 4: 
“Monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and 
user behaviour, are at least partially accountable to the users 
and/or are the users themselves.”
The generation and distribution of financial benefits 
among participating WMA villages mainly originate from 
tourist lodge investors and safari tour operators. However, 
the right to choose, directly negotiate, and collect shares of 
tourism revenues from these investors first shifted away 
from the Village Governments toward the Authorized 
Association and, with the 2016 Wildlife Conservation (non-
consumptive wildlife utilization) Regulations, toward the 
Director of Wildlife. Furthermore, the 2009 Wildlife 
Conservation Act eliminates Village Councils’ authority over 
resources such as environmental products including wildlife 
for bushmeat. In Burunge, the result has been that, subject to 
decisions made by the Authorized Authority, local people 
have lost previous rights to hunt and collect environmental 
products important for their livelihoods within the WMA. 
The Authorized Association can get away with making such 
decisions because the members are not directly accountable 
to the local citizens. Ironically, the quite effective enforce-
ment of these unpopular rules is economically possible 
because the Authorized Association can spend WMA reve-
nue, over which Village Councils have lost control, on rule 
enforcement. From the viewpoint of local citizens, this is 
truly a lose-lose situation. Accordingly, through a “rule by 
law” technique of governance, Village Governments have 
lost authority over their land, resources, and associated rev-
enue flows within WMA areas. This strikes at the heart of the 
Local Government (District Authorities) Act (URT, 1982) 
and the Village Land Act (URT, 1999), which vests all execu-
tive power in respect of village affairs and responsibilities 
for managing all village land in the Village Council. Nelson 
and Blomley (2007) also observed that the creation of 
Authorized Associations established a new governance insti-
tution at the village level rather than building on Village 
Councils. Hence, the institutional choice of establishing 
Authorized Associations to govern WMAs undermines 
established democratic institutions at the village level. We 
argue that such sidelining of Village Councils in WMAs 
appears to have been a deliberate agenda from the outset 
such that rights to land and revenues could be recentralized 
while decentralized (Ribot et al., 2006). From a political, 
moral point of view, the WMA Regulations, therefore, appear 
unconstitutional and in conflict with the Local Government 
(District Authorities) Act (URT, 1982). Furthermore, issues 
of contracts and language used in official documents are a 
significant hindrance for communities to exercise their 
rights. Igoe and Croucher (2007) also reported that the use of 
English language, which local people do not understand, led 
to complaints from communities who felt cheated into sign-
ing contracts they did not understand. In fact, to protect their 
current set of rights to land, resources, and revenues within 
their jurisdiction, Village Governments’ most important right 
is the right to abstain from becoming part of a WMA. In the 
case of Burunge, it does not seem that Village Governments 
were fully aware of or informed about the implications and 
risks associated with agreeing to form a WMA. Obviously, 
this is easier to conclude after than before the act, but the 
recentralizing and disenfranchising elements of the 2002 and 
2005 WMAs Regulations are indisputable, and proponents 
of local democracy and local people’s rights to control local 
resources might have warned Village Governments about 
these dangers to their authority.
In line with expectations of local development financed by 
revenue from the WMA, community-level benefits, such as 
the building of classrooms, village offices, and other social 
services have been realized as also observed by Kaswamila’s 
(2012) study in Burunge. However, the current setup, which 
lacks clear mechanisms for making Authorized Associations 
downwardly accountable, prevents communities from evalu-
ating cost and benefits originating from the WMAs on their 
lands, which resonate the findings of Nelson et al. (2007). 
Such lack of transparency may have demoralized communi-
ties explaining the low attendance in meetings related to the 
WMA. Furthermore, WMA benefits have not yet accrued at 
the individual level except in the form of school fees and jobs 
to a few people compared with the participating villages’ pop-
ulation. Songorwa (1999, p. 2068) reported that “the basic 
rule is that one participates if and when the program benefits 
him or her.” Our results demonstrate that most local citizens 
would rather not be part of the WMA precisely because they 
do not benefit. Unfortunately, the institutional setup prevents 
them from influencing the rules they are unhappy with, and it 
seems to keep them from leaving the WMA as well.
Conclusion
This article evaluated and assessed the institutional rhetoric 
and reality during the establishment and management of 
Burunge WMA. Furthermore, with the point of departure in 
our field data and observations, we analyzed the official WMA 
policy and, during the period 2013 to 2016, frequently updated 
Regulations to explore nexuses between official/original 
WMA-related policy and law, and between official law and 
resource governance at the local level. We observed that local 
people, contrary to the rhetoric livelihood enhancing objec-
tives of the 1998 Wildlife policy, felt disenfranchised and dis-
possessed because of the WMA. The level of local participation 
during the establishment phase was low, and the quality of 
information offered to local people about the implications of 
establishing a WMA suffered from what appeared to range 
from intimidation and manipulation to “economising with the 
truth.” Most importantly, however, the WMA-related legisla-
tion, from the very outset, undermined the authority of 
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democratically elected Village Governments over village 
lands, including wildlife and other renewable natural resources 
as well as associated revenue. The simple technique was, by 
law, to invent a new organization, Authorized Association, and 
transfer most of the authority previously held by Village 
Governments to them. Authorized Associations are not par-
ticularly downwardly accountable because they are not legally 
obliged to publish or share financial details about their activi-
ties. Over time, Authorized Associations have become increas-
ingly upwardly accountable to the central administration, 
particularly the Director of Wildlife. From 2016, the Director 
of Wildlife took over the collection of WMA fees, mainly 
from eco-tourism investors, while keeping 25% of the pro-
ceeds—in reality, a new tax on WMA revenues tautologically 
justified by the costs of collecting fees. Notably, this process 
of stripping Village Governments of their authority within 
WMAs has happened in full accordance with the law.
Hence, we document the legislative techniques charac-
terizing a particular case of “re-centralising while decentral-
izing” where legislation that should put the policy objective 
of participatory wildlife management into practice appears 
intentionally designed to undermine local authority over 
wildlife as a common pool resource. This process might be 
termed dispossession by law or rule by law (as opposed to 
the rule of law) and runs entirely counter to Ostrom’s (1990, 
2009) principles of decentralized resource governance based 
on voluntary collaboration on devising, revising, and enforc-
ing resource management rules. Rather, the process resem-
bles Kelly’s (2011) analysis of conservation practice as 
primitive accumulation. More specifically, we characterize 
our findings as practices of a neo-patrimonial state that, 
under a neoliberal conservation discourse and in association 
with international NGOs, pretends to promote rural liveli-
hoods. In fact, it is rather promoting wildlife habitat enlarge-
ment and corridor establishment while appropriating control 
over WMA land and wildlife resources including a large 
share of associated tourism revenues. Other scholars reach 
almost similar conclusions on community-based natural 
resource conservation efforts in Tanzania, for example, 
Bluwstein (2017), Moyo, Ijumba, and Lund (2016), 
Benjaminsen et al. (2013), Benjaminsen and Bryceson 
(2012), and Igoe and Croucher (2007).
Currently, Village Governments must abstain from join-
ing WMAs if they want to maintain authority over their 
land and, according to anecdotal information, several have 
in fact done so. However, common pool governance of 
wildlife resources that result in net benefits for rural people 
is still possible if villages are allowed to voluntarily col-
laborate with each other, with conservation NGOs, eco-
tourism investors, and the Central Government. No theory 
suggests that dispossession of local communities’ rights to 
local resources is a prerequisite for economically equitable 
and biologically sustainable management of renewable nat-
ural resources—on the contrary. Village Governments, 
whose combined lands offer eco-tourism as well as 
conservation potentials that NGOs and investors are willing 
to invest sufficient funds in, should be able to negotiate an 
agreement that encompasses all parties’ legitimate inter-
ests, which in particular includes local people whose liveli-
hood activities will be affected. Of course, it is hard to 
estimate just how much money “sufficient funds” is and 
how eco-tourism revenues should be shared to fulfill the 
objective of Pareto optimality where nobody gets worse off 
while somebody (as many as possible) becomes better off. 
However, if neoliberal nature conservation is ever going to 
deliver morally justifiable outcomes, then the financial 
risks must primarily be shouldered by investors and NGOs. 
It is simply not fair if local communities stand to lose 
authority over their land and renewable natural resources 
for the sake of securing profits for investors and income to 
central government institutions. Precisely for this reason, 
democratically elected downwardly accountable Village 
Governments must be central and they, as representatives 
of their constituencies, should be able to renegotiate terms 
with investors both on local people’s use of land otherwise 
set aside for wildlife conservation and the sharing of eco-
tourism profits. A basic principle in getting the incentive 
structure right must be that if an arrangement does not 
result in sufficient net benefits for villagers, then it should 
be possible for their governments to opt out. Currently, 
Village Councils are best advised not to opt in when pre-
sented with the opportunity to join a WMA.
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